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ABSTRACT
Viet Nam has undergone a profound transformation in recent years and, as
a result of a series of macroeconomic and institutional reforms since 1986, it has
made substantial progress toward becoming a market economy.  As this transition
continues, Viet Nam faces the challenge of formulating and implementing a growth
strategy which is both economically and politically feasible.  Critical to this growth
strategy is the role of agriculture and, within agriculture, the development of an
efficient rice marketing system. The emergence of Viet Nam as a major rice expo ter
has raised a number of important policy questions.  First, will the country be able
to continue its impressive growth?  Second, how far has Viet Nam moved along the
path toward a market economy?  Third, what is the role of the government in the
development of a rice market economy?  Finally, what is the best way to promote
food security?  The paper addresses these issues and report the results of a study
conducted by IFPRI for the Asian Development Bank in collaboration with the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Government of Vi t Nam.  The
study is based on extensive data collection from marketing agents (frmer , traders,
millers, state owned enterprises, and exporters) conducted during 1995 and 1996.
RICE MARKETS, AGRICULTURAL GROWTH, 
AND POLICY OPTIONS IN VIETNAM
INTRODUCTION
The past 10 years have witnessed a remarkable success in Viet Nam
agricultural production.  As the country has moved from a central planning system
to a market economy, the response of the agricultural sector has been impressive.
Production of paddy has grown at over 5 percent per year during the past 10 years,
outperforming the growth of population and transforming Viet Nam from a food
importing country to a leading rice exporter.  This transformation was largely the
result of liberalization of agricultural markets.  Resolution No. 10 in 1988
recognized the farm household as the central economic unit responsible for its
production decisions.  Resolution No. 5 in 1993 further moved in the direction of
rural development and recognized the rights of land use.  
To ensure similar success over the next 10 years is a major challenge.
Among the main issues in food policy that Viet Nam needs to confront, this study
focuses on rice policy and examines four main questions related to: a) the
prospects for future growth; b) the steps along the path  towardsa m ket economy;
c) the role of the government in a market economy; and d) the best ways to ensure
food security.
The first question is:  Will the country be able to continue its impressive
growth in rice production and exports?  If Viet Nam continued its current
production growth during the next ten years while maintaining a restrictive export
policy, it could induce poor prospects for the agricultural sector.  Internal demand
would be unlikely to absorb future growth in production. 
As aggregate income grows, consumers will shift away from rice towards more
costly foods and diversified diet.  This is already the case in the richest parts of the
country, such as HCMC and Hanoi.  With an internal demand growing at 2 percent,
and with a restrictive export policy, the effect on price of rice could be catastrophic.
In a market economy, excess production would result in a fall of prices, leading in
turn to lower farmer income.
Even with much lower productivity growth than in the past 10 years, Viet Nam
has the potential for increased rice exports.  In fact, Viet Nam could rival Thailand
as the leading rice exporter if a more efficient and effective marketing system were
developed.  The major constraints in achieving this potential lie in the rice
marketing system.
If it is true that the major constraints to future growth lie within the marketing
system, the second question is:  How far has Viet Nam moved along the path
2toward a market economy in the rice subsector?  Whereas the private sector is
the main sector involved in agricultural production, the marketing sector is still
characterized by a significant presence of the public sector.  State owned
enterprises (SOE) are the only participants in rice exports.  SOE rice exports,
however, would not be possible without the intermediation of private traders and
millers. Despite the enormous gap in size and assets between private sector and
SOE, the private sector is responsible for m ving and distributing about 80 percent
of the rice produced in Viet Nam. 
The private sector marketing system is still largely underdeveloped.  This
underdevelopment is reflected not only in small size of transactions, storage, and
asset basis, but also in the local nature of trade.  Most of the private sector
marketing agents are operating at relatively short distance from their residence in
spite of the existence of regional rice deficit that could represent an opportunity for
a sizable inter-regional trade.  Price differences among regions are still wide and
are above the transportation costs. 
The comparison with other countries at similar level of development confirms
the low integration of Viet Nam domestic markets.  Domestic restrictions are partly
responsible for this low level of integration.  Barriers to entry into the rice export
business, however, are the most limiting factor in the development of an efficient
marketing system, as they prevent competition among marketing agents that would
result in lower distribution costs and improved quality for domestic and international
markets.
The commitment of the government to move further along the direction of a
market economy raises the third question: What is the role of government in the
development of a rice market economy?  If the private sector develops, it will be
mostly responsible for the decision concerning production and distribution of rice.
Given the crucial role of rice for growth of agriculture and for food security, the
government needs to ensure that markets develop in a balanced manner, without
adversely affecting the development of the rural economy and the food security of
vulnerable groups.
An important function of the state is therefore to promote a stable
macroeconomic environment leading to the promotion of private sector investment.
Only if the private sector recognizes the commitment of the government to such
stable environment, will it have the incentives to carry out the investments needed
to improve the marketing system, thus saving precious resources in the state
budget.
The private sector, however, will not have incentives to investing in public
goods where the benefit of the investment cannot be appropriated.  Examples of
these public good investments are rural infrastructure, agricultural research, and
extension of market and technology information.
3Finally, the legal infrastructure to clarify property rights, enforce co tracts, and
establish transparent rules is as important as the physical infrastructure.  This legal
infrastructure reduces the risks and transaction costs of market operations, thus
facilitating  trade, storage, and processing activities.
However important, growth and efficiency cannot be pursued by neglecting
the vulnerable groups of society.  Key to food policyis to insure food security of the
population.  Then, the final question becomes:  What is the best way to provide
food security?  To try to meet the needs of the poor by price policy (that is
lowering the price of food) and by trade policy (restricting exports) is generally a
self-defeating policy.  Lower rice prices and lower exports result in slower
agricultural growth, lower national income, and hurt the rural pop l tion where most
of the poor are found.
By allowing the country to grow, the government may redistribute the gains
from growth using more efficient and effective ways to meet the need of the poor
and the food insecure.  Targeted programs are the best examples of this type of
redistribution.
This study addresses the four general issues mentioned above based on an
analysis of the rice marketing system in Vietnam conducted by IFPRI (see IFPRI
1996).  Section 2 provides a background to rice production and rice policy in Viet
Nam.  Section 3 describes the structure of rice markets.  Section 4 presents the
results on the performance of rice markets in Viet Nam.  Section 5 describes the
structure of rice exports in Vietnam in relation to world markets.  Section 6
describes the multimarket spatial-equilibrium model (called VASEM) used to
examine the effects of policy options and the long-run prospects for Vietnames
rice exports.  In section 7, VASEM is used to simulate the effect of eliminating the
rice export quota, the effect of removing barriers to internal trade, and the long-run
prospects for rice exports.  Section 8 summarizes the main results and section 9
presents the policy recommendations.
BACKGROUND
In the past fifteen years, Viet Nam has moved gradually away from centralized
control of agricultural decisions and toward a more market-based system.  In 1981,
the government responded to declining per capita food production by issuing
Instruction 100, which shifted from collective agriculture to a system of production
contracts in which individual farmers took greater responsibility for fulfilling
production quotas.  Combined with higher procurement prices and better weather,
these reforms resulted in several years of rising per capita food production.
In the late 1980s, stagnating agricultural production and weather-related
shortages catalyzed more fundamental reform of the agricultural sector.  In 1988,
Resolution 10 legalized private ownership of farm implements and animals and
Figure 1.  Per Capita Paddy Output
Viet Nam, 1976 -1996
1976 1980 1985 1990 1995
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Source:  Data from GSO.
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 Vietnamese observers believe that an additional 500 thousand tons was1
exported illegally to China.  This agrees with estimates based on rough balance
sheet calculations.
assigned cooperative land to individual farmers on long-term leases.  The sale of
agricultural surpluses and private trade in agricultural goods were legalized and
promoted, thus expanding the scope f agricultural markets (see IFPRI, 1996: 31).
Rice production has responded dramatically to these reforms.  Between 1988
and 1995, cultivated area expanded 3.1% per year.  This growth has been largely
due to increases in the cropping intensity, particularly in the Mekong River Delta.
 The increased cropping intensity is, in turn, the result of investment in irrigation
and the adoption of new rice varieties with shorter maturation periods. Over the
same period, rice yields grew 2.4% per year, primarily as a result of better water
control and the adoption of higher-yielding varieties.  The combined result is that
rice production has grown 5.6% per year over the period 1988-1995 (Viet Nam,
1996b and IFPRI, 1996:111-112).  Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase of paddy
production per capita in the  period after unification.
Over the same period, apparent rice consumption (production minus net
exports) has risen about 3.1 percent per year.  This is greater than the 2.1 percent
annual population growth over this period (Viet Nam, 1996a).  From 1962 to 1988,
Viet Nam was a net rice importer every year except in 1983.  Since 1989, Viet Nam
has exported rice every year, with the volume rising to 2.02 million tons in 19951
and about 3 million tons in 1996.  This puts Viet Nam among the three largest rice
exporters in the world together with Thailand and the United States.  
The rice markets in Viet Nam re not, however, completely liberalized.  First,
the government imposes a rice export quota.  Interviews with expor ers suggest that
5the quota is binding, a conclusion confirmed by persistent differentials between
domestic and international rice prices.  For example, in 1995 the export unit value
of Vietnamese rice was US$269 per ton, compared to the MRD wholesale price of
US$205 per ton.  Vietnamese policy-makers defend the export quota as necessary
to ensure adequate supplies of rice for Vietnamese consumers.  Rice is the
dominant staple, accounting for 66% of caloric intake (World Bank, 1995).  In
addition, it is argued that liberalizing exports would increase Viet Nam's exposure
to volatile international rice markets.  This volatility is related to the thinness of
world rice markets: only 3 to 5% of world production is traded (IFPRI, 1996: 100).
Second, the government restricts rice movements within the country.  The
documentation and administrative procedures required to transport rice from the
south to the north of Viet Nam are comparable to those required to export rice.  One
justification given by the government for the res rictions on south-north trade is that
the main surplus region is the Mekong River Delta in the south, while the
destination of much of the smuggled rice is China, on the norther border.  Most of
the south-north movement, however, is legitimate trade from the Mekong River
Delta to the northern regions of Viet Nam which have a combined rice deficit of
almost 900 thousand tons.  Thus, legitimate internal trade is restricted, partly in
order to control illegal exports.   Movements of rice within the north and within the
south are less tightly regulated but is still subject to roadblocks, tolls, and other
restrictions from local authorities, according to IFPRI interviews with traders, millers,
and state-owned enterprises (see IFPRI, 1996: 70).  
The restrictions on internal trade are reflected in rice price differentials which
exceed transportation costs.  For example, in 1995 the average wholesale price of
rice was US$64 per ton higher in the north than in the south, yet data from the
IFPRI survey of traders suggest that the cost of transporting rice from the south to
the north is only US$27 per ton (IFPRI, 1996: 188).
The third type of restriction is that state-owned enterprises have a monopoly
on rice exports and on south-north trade.  The monopoly on rice exports and long-
distance internal rice trade is seen by policy makers as necessary to ensure
legitimate internal trade while preventing smuggling.  In addition, the profits
generated by state-owned enterprises are an important source of revenue for the
central government.
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) carried out a series
of surveys of farmers, traders, millers, and state-owned enterprises as part of a
larger study of rice markets during 1995-1996.  These data, combined with data
from other sources, were used to derive conclusions related to the structure,
performance of rice markets and export system.  The information was further used
to develop a spatial-equilibrium model of the markets for rice and three other staple
foods in Viet Nam.  The model is designed to provide regionally-disaggregated
information to policy makers concerning the impact of alternative rice policies on
6rice prices, production, consumption, exports, household welfare, and other
variables of interest.  
For the purpose of the analysis, Viet Nam is divided into seven agro cological
regions (see Figure 2).  The North Mountain and Midlands (NMM) region is a large,
sparsely-populated mountainous area bordering China.  The NMM has the largest
rice deficit of the seven regions.  The Red River Delta (RRD) is a fertile, irrigated
region in the north with a high population density.  RRD farmers produce a surplus
large enough to supply Ha Noi, located in the RRD, and to cover part of the NMM
deficit.  The North Central Coast (NCC) is a rice deficit region with the lowest per
capita income of the seven regions.  The South Central Coast is also a deficit
region, where agriculture is often disrupted by typhoons.  The Central Highland
(CH) is a sparsely populated, mountainous, rice-deficit region.  Recently, th
production of cash crops (particularly coffee) has grown rapidly in the CH.  The
Northeast South (NES) is an urbanized region that includes Viet Nam’s largest city,
Ho Chi Minh City.  Although a rice deficit area, the NES is economically diversified
and has the highest per capita income of the seven regions.  The southern-most
region is the Mekong River Delta (MRD), a fertile and mostly-irrigated area with rice
surpluses of over 4 million tons.  It is larger than the RRD and, being further south,
has a longer growing season which allows a greater cropping intensity than is
possible in the RRD.  Table 1 summarizes some of the main characteristics of the
seven regions.
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
2200-2400 mm
8-15C
120 pers/sq.km
891,477 ha
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
2400 mm
12-18C
1124 pers/sq.km
626,500 ha
2. RED RIVER DELTA (RRD)
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
1400 mm
20-22C
167 pers/sq.km
448,884 ha
4. SOUTH CENTRAL COAST (SCC)
3. NORTH CENTRAL COAST (NCC)
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
1800-2000 mm
14-16C
190 pers/sq.km
531,688 ha
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
1800-2200 mm
15-18C
53 pers/sq.km
276,343 ha
5. CENTRAL HIGHLANDS (CH)
7. MEKONG RIVER DELTA (MRD)
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
1600-2400 mm
22-25C
400 pers/sq.km
2,103,213 ha
Pluviometry
Lowest temperature
Population density
Annual crop land
:
:
:
:
1600-2200 mm
22-23C
378 pers/sq.km
525,017 ha
6. NORTHEAST SOUTH (NES)
1. NORTH MOUNTAIN AND MIDLAND (NMM)
FIG 2 - VIETNAM AGRO-ECOLOGICAL REGIONS
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Table 1.  Agroecological regions of Viet Nam
Source:  Data from GSO
North 
Mountains and 
Midlands
Red River Delta
North Central 
Coast
South Central 
Coast
Central 
Highlands
Northeast 
South
Mekong River 
Delta
Population 
(million)
12.4 14.1 9.7 7.6 3 8.9 15.9
Population density 
(person/km2)
120 1124 190 167 53 378 401
Urbanization 
(%urban)
13 17 11 23 23 46 13
Paddy production 
(1000 tons)
2254 4623 2141 1749 429 935 12832
Paddy yield 
(tons/ha)
2.79 4.44 3.14 3.38 2.48 2.66 4.02
Rice consumption 
(kg/capita)
156 170 153 145 162 131 160
Rice surplus 
(1000 tons)
-759 173 -291 -159 -247 -654 4468
Per capita 
expenditures 
('1000' 1992 
Dong/person/year)
963 1102 871 1267 1481 1840 1469
Farmers Traders Millers Traders Consumers
SOE
P2
P3 R2
P4
P5
P6
P1
R3
R9
R8
R7R1
R4
R5
R6
RICE CIRCUITPADDY  CIRCUIT
RICE CIRCUITPADDY  CIRCUIT
Exporters
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MARKET STRUCTURE
Central to the rice marketing system of Viet Nam is the complex web of
relationships among its key participants, namely farmers, t aders, millers, and SOE.
The links between these agents can be described by an analysis of marketing
channels.  The overall purpose of these channels is to transport and store the
paddy produced by farmers, to transform it into rice, and to distribute it to
consumers, both for domestic consumption and exports (see figure 3).
Four main conclusions emerge from the analysis of the structure of marketing
channels and the operations of marketing agents, namely: a) the high level of
commercialization and the involvement of the private sector not only at the
Table 2:  Marketed Surplus by Season
Sales as Percent of Production
Source:  IFPRI survey 1995-96
NMM RRD NCC SCC CH NES MRD Viet 
Nam
Winter- 
Spring 16 65 35 34 44 72 77 70
Summer- 
Autumn
. . 32 41 47 49 64 60
Rainy 8 58 . . . 29 95 48
All Year 12 62 37 37 45 55 72 64
9
production stage but also at the marketing stage; b) the underdevelopment and
regional unbalance of the private sector, in spite of its importance in the distribution
system; c) the local nature of trade and information; and d) the credit constraints
limiting procurement activities, storage, and investment.
High Level of Commercialization and Importance of the Private Sector
Rice marketing in Viet Nam is highly commercialized.  Paddy sales by farmers
as a proportion of production, the so called marketed surplus, is over 60 percent in
all seasons in the two main producing regions, the RRD and the MRD (see table 2).
The MRD is more commercialized than the RRD with a peak of marketed surplus
of 95 percent occurring during the rainy season.  Other regions are less
commercialized, particularly the NMM and the CH.  Their production is mostly for
home consumption.  The average marketed surplus in NMM, for example, is as low
as 16 percent of total production during the main Winter-Spring crop.
Paddy marketing is dominated by private traders, who procure about 96
percent of total marketed surplus from farmers (see tabl  3).  Millers and SOE  also
buy from farmers, but their importance relative to traders is marginal.  This is true
across different regions and across different seasons.  The weak link between SOE
and farmers suggests that producer price stabilization, considered by many SOE
an important function of their operations, is not the result of paddy procurement.
With only 2 percent of paddy procured from farmers, the extent of SOE stabilization
is quite limited.  The linkage between demand management by SOE and prices
received by farmers takes place through induced demand for rice by SOE.  The
price signals are sent to farmers through the private sector.
Table 3.  Marketing Channels for Farmers
Shares of Farmers Sales
Source:  IFPRI Survey 1995-96
Millers Traders Others
Winter- Spring 1.2 96.9 1.9
Summer- Autumn 1.1 96.9 2
Rainy 8.2 90.7 1.1
All Year 1.6 96.5 1.9
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Traders are the main customers of farmers and they are also the main
suppliers of SOE in the MRD.  The difference between rice marketing in the north
and south is the composition of customers.  In both regions, assemblers are the
main suppliers of wholesalers and millers.  Whereas in RRD, the system of rice is
directed mainly to domestic consumers, in the MRD, the distribution system i
oriented heavily towards SOE.  Moreover, while in the RRD, consumers are the
main customers of SOE, in the MRD SOE’s rice sales are destined mainly to
exports or other SOE (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 4, section 5).
Underdevelopment and Regional Unbalance of Private Sector
In spite of its key role in the rice marketing system of Viet Nam, the private
sector is still underdeveloped and shows a distinct pattern between north and
south.  The trading sector is largely characterized by small transactions and small
assets.  In spite of the existence of some large traders and millers in the south, the
average transactions are still quite small when compared to those of SOE.  The
latter have an average monthly rice sale of over 4,000 tons compared to about 33
tons for traders and 171 tons for millers (see table 4).
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The MRD and the NES have a much more developed marketing system than
in the rest of the country.  Wholesalers in the MRD, for example, sell 91 tons of rice
per month on average, while the average is only 32 tons in the RRD.  Medium-sized
millers sell about 1.75 tons of rice per month in the RRD and about 38 tons in the
MRD. Moreover, there are more large millers and polishers n the MRD and NES
than in the RRD.  Even these large millers, however, are small relative to SOE.  In
the MRD, for example, the largest millers and polishers have average monthly sales
of rice amounting to 1,163 tons, while t e SOE sell about 5,054 in the same region
(see IFPRI 1996, chapter 4, section 4).
Similar considerations apply for the asset basis of various marketing agents.
SOE assets amount to an average of $1,594 thousand, while traders assets are
$2.9 thousand, and millers $31 thousand.  Wholesalers assets in the RRD are $2.1
thousand, while they are $3.8 thousand in the MRD; medium size millers assets in
the RRD are $0.8 thousand, while they are $18.3 thousand in the MRD (see table
3 and IFPRI 1996, chapter 4, section 3).
Local Nature of Trade and Information
Even though Viet Nam has an aggregate surplus of rice that can be exported,
many regions have rice deficit.  It is then necessary to transport rice from surplus
regions of MRD and RRD to the deficit regions.  Domestic trade flows by private
sector and shipment of rice by SOE are the main mechanisms of redistributing
domestic production within the country.  It is estimated that over 2.1 million metric
tons need to be transported across regions in order to ensure food security (see
IFPRI 1996, chapter 11, section 2).  About half of this amount is moved by SOE,
leaving the private sector involved in very small amount of long distance trade.
Over 90 percent of total paddy procurement and rice sales take place within a
radius of 100 km of the marketing agents residence.  The private sector is rarely
Current Credit 
(USD)
Interest Rate 
(%)
Required 
Credit (USD)
Wholesaler
RRD 2,102 2.57 6,556
NES 1,810 5.04 262,202
MRD 4,014 4.43 18,143
Medium Miller
RRD 571 2.17 3,810
NES 2,133 2.5 14,206
MRD 4,873 2.56 25,360
State Owned 
Enterprise
RRD 141,231 1.27 89,524
NES 3,454,382 1.53 9,206,349
MRD 5,769,893 1.75 14,147,186
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involved in rice trade transactions at more than 400 km distance (see IFPRI 1996,
chapter 4, section 6).
This local nature of marketing is also reflected in the limited information of
marketing agents of rice markets situation outside of their immediate surroundings.
Most agents indicate personal contacts as the main source of information for prices
and regulations affecting their business.  Even though half of wholesalers own a
telephone, access to broader and more formal market information is very limited
(see IFPRI 1996, chapter 4, section 8).
Credit Constraints
All marketing agents, both from private sec or and SOE, agree in being credit
constrained.  The extent of this constraint is reported to be very high:  credit
requirements vary between 3 and 10 times the actual credit available to market
agents.  The interest rate that private marketing agents were prepared to pay for
access to additional credit is close to market rate, whereas SOE willingness to pay
for additional credit is below market rate (see table 5, and IFPRI 1996, chapter 4,
section 9).
The credit constraints assessment by marketing agents is reflected partly in
the very short-term storage behavior.  Holding stock of rice for more than two weeks
is rare among private sector agents a d only large millers and polishers can afford
to do that, with average holding period of 16 days for large millers in the MRD.  The
average holding period for traders is less than a week.  SOE can afford to store rice
for longer periods, with an averag holding period of about 4 weeks for SOE in the
MRD (see table 6, and IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 4).
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MARKET PERFORMANCE
In a market economy, prices are the main incentives for agricultural
production and marketing.  The study of their behavior is therefore critical to the
understanding of the market system performance. Prices affect revenues and costs
and therefore profits of various marketing agents.  Price signals are transmitted
over time and over space and affect the allocation of resources.  If the transmission
of price signals is imperfect, then the performance of the marketing system will
suffer.  
The reforms initiated in the latter part of the 1980s have radically changed the
rice marketing system of Viet Nam, promoting the development of a market
economy and a private sector.  Market performance has improved during this
period, yet several problems remain in order to develop an efficient and effective
marketing system.  Four main aspects of market performance deserve
consideration: a) price variability and margins; b) price transmissio across spatially
separated markets and market integration; c) marketing costs, profitability, and
investment response; and d) restrictions to domestic trade.
Price Variability and Margins
Macroeconomic stabilization in the early 1990's has percolated down to the
rice sector.  Rice price inflation declined from about 650 percent in 1987 to about
20 percent in 1995 (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 2). Macroeconomi
stabilization has also implied a much lower intra-year price variation:  the coefficient
of variation of monthly rice prices was 0.05 in the period 1991-95 compared to 0.27
in the period 1986-1990 (see figure 4). Macroeconomic policies, however, have
contributed to declining real prices of paddy and rice in the period 1989-1995.
Figure 4.  Coefficient of Variation
of Paddy Prices
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
0
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Source:  Data from GSO.
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Seasonality is not very pronounced in the aggregate.  In the period 1991-95,
the range between seasonal peak and trough is about 9.8 percent.  The seasonal
variation is slightly higher in the north than in south (10.9 versus 8.5 percent).  The
aggregate picture, however, hides a considerable variation at district level, where
it is possible to see seasonal variation of up to 27 percent (se  IFPRI 1996, chapter
5, section 2).  Seasonality of price is a reflection of seasonality of production.  In
Viet Nam paddy is harvested somewhere each month of the year.  March is the
month with the largest harvest (about 22 percent of the total), and the four months
from May to August contribute an additional 46 percent of total production.  The
deficit during the lean months (September to January) totals 2.46 million tons (see
IFPRI 1996, chapter 11, section 3).
Paddy prices are about 15 percent above the country average in the north and
about 12 percent below country average in the south. These regional differences
do not show any relevant trend over time (see figure 5).  There is no indication of
either convergence or divergence of regional prices towards a common level (see
IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 2). 
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Rice prices are about 70 percent above paddy prices. As in the case of
regional prices, there is no indication of either long term convergence or divergence
between paddy and rice prices (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 2).  On the other
hand, the prices of rice and paddy have declined in real terms since 1990 (see
figure  6).
Price Transmission and Market Integration
Over the period 1991-1995, the number of segmented market links has
decreased from 34 to 20 percent of total links. This improvement reflects better
price transmission between markets in Viet Nam.  However, still only 54 percent of
price shocks are transmitted across markets, indicating a system of spatially
Egypt 
Wheat
Bangladesh 
Rice
Malawi 
Maize
Pakistan 
Wheat
Viet Nam 
Rice
Long Term 
Multiplier 0.35 0.73 0.49 0.47 0.54
Speed of 
Adjustment
3.53 2.6 5.7 3.39 5.15
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separated markets that is still characterized by a ver  low degree of integration. On
average, the adjustment of prices is very slow: it takes about 5 months for price
shocks originating in one market to be transmitted to another market (see IFPRI
1996, chapter 5, section 3).  
The comparison with other developing countries highlights the poor
performance of Viet Nam both because of its poor infrastructure and the presence
of trade restrictions (see table 7).  In spite of the active participation of the private
sector, the local nature of domestic trade makes it difficult to eliminate price
differentials across spatially separated markets (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 4, section
6).
Marketing Costs, Profitability, and Investment
The private sector has lower marketing costs than SOEs.  Unit costs of SOEs
in the MRD are $44/ton whereas they are $6.55/ton for large millers.  Even after
taking into account the higher taxes paid by SOEs, SOE costs are about five times
higher (see table 8).  The main components of these higher costs for SOEs are
higher labor and transportation costs (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 4).
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Source:  IFPRI Survey 1995-1996.
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Market reforms have promoted marketing activities and improved the
profitability of various marketing agents as witnessed by the surge in investment of
the private sector at the beginning of the 1990s.  Millers responded earlier with
investment in new machinery, particularly in the NES and MRD (see figure 7).
Traders have also responded, but with a lag of two years, reaching their peak in
1994-1995 (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 5).
The greater development of the marketing system in the south does not
penalize either farmers or consumers.  In spite of higher share of retail price going
to marketing agents in the MRD than in the RRD (29 percent versus 17 percent),
both farmers and consumers are better off in the MRD than in the RRD.  Farmers
get higher profits, both in absolute terms ($148/ton versus $91/ton) and as a share
Table 9.  Composition of Retail Price
Source:  IFPRI Survey 1995-96
RRD 
(USD/ton)
RRD (% 
retail price)
MRD 
(USD/ton)
MRD (% 
retail price)
Farmers Unit Cost 206 65 120 40
Unit Profit 57 18 93 31
Farmgate 
Price
263 83 213 71
Marketing 
Agents Unit Cost 19 6 33 11
Unit Profit 34 11 55 18
Marketing 
Margin 53 17 88 29
Retail Price 316 100 301 100
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of retail price (49 percent versus 29 percent).  Consumers are better off because
of lower price of rice (see table 9, and IFPRI 1996, chapter 5, section 4).
Restrictions on Domestic Trade
Restrictions on inter-provincial movements of rice are perceived by th  private
sector and SOEs as seriously limiting the flow of rice from south to north (see table
10).  Regulations set up in the past to curb rice smuggling are still in effect and
make trade from south to north so difficult that they are similar to the procedures
needed to trade with another country.  Only 42 percent of the gap between prices
in the north and the south is explained by the cost of transportation and marketing.
The remaining 58 percent is the result of various constraints, notably the
restrictions on the inter-regional movement of rice (see figure 8, and IFPRI 1996,
chapter 5, section 6).
Table 10.   Restrictions on the Movement of goods
Source:  IFPRI Survey 1995-96.
Region
Marketing 
Agent
Percentage 
Reporting
First Type of 
Restriction
Second Type of 
Restriction
NMM Retailer 3 Police Inter-Province
Wholesaler 83 Police Inter-Province
Assembler 6 Police
SOE 100 Police Inter-Province
RRD Retailer 0
Wholesaler 12 Tolls Inter-Province
Assembler 0
SOE 60 Police Inter-Province
NCC Wholesaler 100 Tolls Inter-District
Assembler 6 Police
SCC Wholesaler 7
SOE 100 Other
CH Wholesaler 15 Other Inter-Province
NES Wholesaler 8 Inter-Province Other
SOE 17 Inter-District Inter-Province
MRD Retailer 1 Police Inter-Province
Wholesaler 31 Inter-Province Police
Assembler 51 Inter-District Inter-Province
SOE 71 Inter-Province MOT
Viet Nam Retailer 1 Police Inter-Province
Wholesaler 23 Inter-Province Police
Assembler 17 Inter-District Inter-Province
SOE 57 Inter-Province Police
Source:  IFPRI Survey, 1995-1996.
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EXPORTS AND WORLD MARKETS
Rice exports from Viet Nam are often cited as the success story of agricultural
policy reforms.  After many years of being a net importer of food, in 1989 Viet Nam
exported 1.4 million tons. After eight years, the position of Viet Nam among major
rice exporters seems consolidated, with an average of more than two million tons
of rice exports over the past five years.  
International markets are in continuous flux.  In the past couple of years India
has emerged as a new leading exporter, and it may well continue to be so in th
years to come.  Rice importers are characterized by high turnover and the world
rice markets is well known for its instability.  It is important therefore to understand
the features of past growth of exports from Viet Nam and to relate them to
international markets in order to identify the constraints to future growth.  Five main
sets of issues deserve particular attention, namely: a) the relation between export
growth and food security; b) the quality of exported rice; c) price transmission and
price comparisons; d) world markets and major competitors; and e) constraints to
future growth.
Rice Exports and Food Security
Rice exports in the period between 1989 and 1995 have averaged at 11
percent of total production and grown at a rapid rate of 8.4 percent annually.  The
export growth has not compromised food security of the country as measured by the
rice calories per capita per day.  Food availability considerations only would have
probably reduced the exports in the initial years of this period, whereas they would
have allowed more exports in recent years (see figure 9).  An additional million tons
of exports in 1995 would have been consistent with food security, yet would have
generated an additional USD300 million  (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 11, section 2).
Export Price 
(USD/ton)
Bangkok 5% 
Broken 
(USD/ton)
Export Price as 
Percentage of 
Bangkok Price
1989 194 300 65
1990 170 271 63
1991 226 293 77
1992 207 268 77
1993 203 236 86
1994 218 270 81
1995 266 320 83
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Quality of Exported Rice
The quality of rice exports from Viet Nam has increased dramatically over the
years.  Whereas Viet Nam had a reputation in the early 1990s for being an exporter
of cheap and low quality rice, it has more recently gained a reputation for better
quality rice, at least for rice with a broken percentage of 10 percent or less.  In
1995, more than 55 percent of otal rice exported was of 10 percent broken quality
or better.  The focus on broken percentage has neglected other aspects of quality
that are important to international markets, such as homogeneity of the grain,
variety improvement, fragrance, length, etc.  
Price Transmission and Price Comparisons
The prices of Vietnamese export rice are becoming closer to Bangkok prices
(see table 11).  In 1990, export prices of 5 percent broken were 40 percent below
the 5 percent broken Bangkok prices, whereas in 1995 they were just 11 percent
below.   This has been the result of improved milling technology and acquired
experience in international markets.  
Even though the trend of domestic prices follows the trend of border prices,
changes in border prices is only partially transmitted.  About 20 percent of the
changes in international prices are transmitted to domestic prics.  Th s is the result
of policy intervention in the form of quota on exports, and of infrastructural and
institutional bottlenecks.
The impact of an export quota is very similar to that of an export tax: both
policies reduce exports, lower the domestic price of the good, benefit consumers,
and penalize producers.  The impact can be measured by estimating the implicit tax
rate, defined as the xport tax that would have the same effect on domestic prices
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as the quota.  We can get a measure of implicit tax rate in 1995 comparing the
domestic wholesale price in the export region with the average export price.  Taking
into consideration the transport costs, the implicit tax associated with the export
quota is 24 percent (see IFPRI 1986, chapter 12, section 3).
World Markets and Major Competitors
The international rice trade is characterized by thinness, volatility, and risk.
Less than 5 percent of total milled production is traded, price variability is higher
than for other cereals, and the turnover of major importers and exporters is very
high.
World rice production has been growing at a rate higher than the world
population during the past 30 years, mostly due to growing yields, particularly in
Asia, associated with the Green Revolution.  In the 1990s, however, yield growth,
though still positive, has been considerably lower than in previous decades, and
total production has grown less than world population (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 7,
section 2).
During the 1980s several countries in Asia strictly adhered to a policy of rice
self-sufficiency,  but the situation has changed radically during the 1990's, making
the international rice market very dynamic.  Indonesia and China started to rely
upon rice imports to meet their rice requirements.  Japan and Korea committed
themselves during GATT negotiation to import rice.  Viet Nam has imposed a
steady presence among the leading exporters together with Thailand and the USA.
India may be the next rising star among the rice  exporters.
The world market has become more competitive and price sensitive.  Tha land
and Viet Nam could both compete in the high and low quality rice, whereas the USA
is largely oriented to high quality.  Only the USA, Australia, and China can provide
medium japonica rice, in demand by Japan and Korea.
East and Southeast Asia are the major markets for Viet Nam’s rice, with
Malaysia the most regular among the major buyers of Vietnamese rice.  During
1995, China was a major market for Vietnamese rice.  New markets, especially
those in Latin America and in the Middle East deserve more attention of
Vietnamese exporters in the future.
As the cost of production is largely favorable to Viet Nam, it is important to
complement comparative advantage with competitive advantage based on a
marketing strategy that promotes Viet Nam rice in several countries, particularly
those rice importers characterized by moderate-high and stable growth.
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Constraints to Future Growth
Credit constraints affect the performance of rice exporters very seriously;
SOEs declared that their credit requirements are about three times the current
average loans of $3.45 and $5.77  million in the NES and MRD, respectiv ly.  SOEs
pay monthly interest rates varying between 1.53 and 1.75 percent, which is
subsidized relative to a market rate of about 2.3 percent.
Transportation cost to ship rice exports is very high in Viet Nam, relatively to
other Southeast Asian ports.  A shipment of 10,000 tons out of Saigon could easily
cost about $40,000 in various dues, while the same shipment would cost about
$20,000 in Thailand.  The premium that Bangkok rice prices have on Viet Nam
prices are partly a reflection of this higher transportation cost.
Foreign buyers’ major concern about Vietnamese rice exports is the lack of
a consistent policy.  Past experiences with repudiation of contracts have given
Vietnamese rice exporters a bad reputation.  The government has an important role
to play to ensure the enforcement of international contracts.
MODELING THE RICE SYSTEM:  VASEM
The emergence of Viet Nam as a major rice exporter has raised a number of
important policy issues.  One of the most important issues is how to balance the
need for an adequate supply of rice for its population with the need for foreign
currency generated by rice exports.  In order to keep the domestic rice price low
and ensure sufficient domestic supplies, the government has imposed a quota on
rice exports.  However, little is known about the effect of the rice export quota on
prices, incomes, and production, and how a relaxation of the quo a would affect rice
markets. 
Another important policy issue concerns regional disparities within the country
and the effect of internal rice trade on these disparities.  The Mekong River Delta
(MRD) is a surplus region while the north, particularly the North Mountain and
Midland (NMM) region, is a deficit area.  To control rice exports, the government
tightly regulates the shipment of rice from the south to the north.  In addition,
national and local authorities have, on occasion, restricted the movement of ric
between provinces and even between districts in the interest of food security.  To
evaluate this policy, it is necessary to understand the regional dimension of rice
marketing policy and, in particular, how barriers to internal trade ffect rice markets.
The third issue concerns the long-run prospects for Viet Nam as a rice
exporter, given its land constraints, its rapidly rising income, and its population
growth.  Some analysts argue that VieNam may not be able to sustain the current
levels of exports in the face of expanding internal demand and the difficulty o
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maintaining the area expansion and yield improvement of the past decade
(Valdecañas, 1996).  A critical issue for Viet Nam is what combination of policies
will allow it to continue expanding rice exports in spite of these constraints.
The main objective of policy analysis is to provide information to the
government regarding important rice marketing issues facing the country.  We start
with the three rice marketing issues discussed above: export quotas, restrictions on
internal trade, and the long-term prospect  for exports.  For each issue, we identify
several alternative rice marketing policies that could be carried out.  Each policy
option is simulated using the Viet Nam Spatial-Equilibrium Agricultural Model
(VASEM) and the results are examined.  In particular, we are interested in the effect
of each policy on food security, income, and export revenue.  To evaluate the policy
alternatives, it is not enough to look at national income or national food
consumption.  We must also examine the effect of each policy on food consumption
among different groups in the population: rich and poor households, urban and rural
households, and households in different regions. 
The VASEM is a multi-market spatial-equilibrium model (the model is
described in Appendix 1; for a more detailed description of the model see IFPRI
1996, chapter 12).  It is a multi-market model in that it simulates the markets for
several related commodities: rice, maize, potatoes and sweet potatoes, and
cassava.  It is a spatial-equilibrium model in that it takes into account regional
differences in production and consumption patterns, as well as the costs of
transporting goods from one region to another.  The model simulates the food
markets in seven regions: the North Mountain and Midlands (NMM), Red River
Delta (RRD), North Central Coast (NCC), South Central Coast (SCC), Central
Highlands (CH), Northeast South (NES), and Mekong River Delta (MRD).  
The model uses a set of equations to represent supply, demand, international
trade, and internal flows among the regions of Viet Nam.  We provide the initial
assumptions by setting the values of the exogenous variables.  The exogenous
variables include international prices, the export quota, taxes, transportation costs,
non-farm income, and marketing margins.  The output of the model is the values of
the endogenous variables that represent the market equilibrium associated with
those assumptions.  The endogenous variables include food production, food
consumption, income, prices, exports, imports, and inter-regional flows for the four
commodities.  
One set of assumptions, called the base scenario, is chosen to represent a
recent year for which data are available.  The base scenario for the VASEM is
designed to represent 1995.  "Experiments" are carried out by changing the
assumptions to represent a different situation or a new policy, running the model,
and comparing the resulting equilibrium with the base scenario.  These experiments
can be used to simulate different policies, such as raising the rice export tax or
adjusting the export quota.  The experiments can also be used to simulate events
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beyond the control of the government, such as an increase in international rice
prices or a decline in rice production.
It is important to recognize that these simulations re ot predictions because
they do not take into account many other factors that affect markets, such a
changes in weather, international markets, infrastructure, and policies in other
countries.  Instead, the simulations give us an idea of what would happen if a
particular policy were adopted and all other factors remained the same.
POLICY OPTIONS AND LONG-RUN PROSPECTS
Elimination of Rice Quota
As shown in Table 12, the model indicates that eliminating the rice quota
would raise domestic rice prices 20% on average, increase exports from 2.5 to 5.7
million tons, and increase national income 5.8 percent, or US$795 million per year.
 Rice consumption falls by 14% due to the higher prices.  Sensitivity analysis
suggests that the increase in exports and the fall in rice consumption may be
overestimated if the price elasticity of demand for rice is less than the elasticities
used in these simulations  (see IFPRI 1996, Chapter 12, section 7).  The results of
sensitivity analysis, however, show that if the domestic price elasticity of demand
for rice were just -0.3, exports would rise to 4.6 million tons  and rice consumption
declines only by 4 percent instead of 14 percent.  We get similar results if we
assume that  the demand for Vietnamese rice exports is not perfectly elastic.
Amount
Change with 
respect to 1995  
baseline
Percent Change
Rice price  (D/kg) 3319 548 19.8
Paddy price (D/kg) 2027 578 39.9
Paddy production  
(1000 t)
27789 2867 11.5
Rice production (1000 t) 15443 1593 11.5
Rice consumption  
(1000 t) 9769 -1549 -13.7
Rice export (1000 t) 5674 3142 124.1
Value export  (US$ m) 1526 845 124.1
Farm income per capita 
(1000 D/yr)
762 166 27.8
Income per capita   
(1000 D/yr)
2175 140 6.9
Total household income  
(US$ m/yr)
14446 932 6.9
Total income   (US$ 
m/yr) 14491 795 5.8
CPI  (base=100) 104 4 4
Staple calories  
(kcal/day)
1372 -206 -13
Table 12.  Overall Effects of Removing 
Export Quota
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Economic theory also suggests that export quotas have effects similar to
export taxes.  The model indicates that the 1995 effective rice export quota of 2.5
million tons is equivalent to a 24 percent tax on rice exports. 
Table 13 demonstrates that the impact of the quota removal has a strong
regional dimension: rice prices rise 30% in the south, 16-27% in the ce tral regions,
and 12-13% in the northern regions.  There are two reasons for this pattern.  First,
rice prices were initially higher in the north so that a given absolute increase in the
rice price is smaller percntage change.  Second, the absolute increase is smaller
outside the south because some of the central and northern regions become self-
sufficient in rice.  Once this happens, regional prices become “disconnected” from
MRD and world prices, and less than the entire MRD price increase is transmitted
to these regions.  
Region
Change in Rice 
Price (%)
Change in Rice 
Production (%)
Change in Rice 
Consumption (%)
North Mountains and 
Midlands
12.4 6.7 -6.6
Red River Delta 13.4 7.5 -7.3
North Central Coast 15.9 8.6 -8.6
South Central Coast 17.8 7.8 -12.8
Central Highlands 26.6 11 -18.9
North East South 29.6 13.9 -24.8
Mekong River Delta 30.2 14.7 -22.4
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It is not surprising that “interior” regions are partially insulated from
international prices and trade policy.  What is less intuitive is that “interior” regions
should be defined according to the commodity flows rather than geography.  For
example, the Red River Delta is a surplus region with a major port, yet its prices are
partially insulated from world prices and trade policy because it does not export and
because it is some distance from the exporting region (the MRD).
Table 14 indicates that the av rage effect of eliminating the rice export quota
is to boost real income by about 4.9% on average.  The increase is highest among
farmers in the MRD (12.8%), but other beneficiaries include the rural poor (5.5%)
and the rural non-poor (6.1%).  Three groups that lose (on average) from the
elimination of the rice export quota are the urban poor (-0.4%), rural non-farm
households (-1.7%), and poor households in the Central Highlands (-1.0%).  
Table 14.  Distributional Effects of 
Removing Export Quota
Source:  Simulation based on VASEM
Percent Change in 
Welfare
National average 4.9
Urban sector 1.3
   Urban poor -0.4
   Urban non-poor 1.6
Rural 5.7
   Rural poor 5.5
   Rural non-poor 6.1
   Rural farmers 6.5
   Rural non-farm -1.7
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Overall, only 33% of Vietnamese households are net sellers of  rice and fully
60% are net buyers (see IFPRI 1986, chapter 11).  Thus, eliminating the rice export
quota would have direct benefits for only one third of the households, but the
multiplier effect of increased rice revenue creates benefits for most groups.    In
terms of extreme poverty, defined by the number of people who are below the
threshold income set at the 10  percentile of the original income distribution, tableth
15 indicates that the poverty rate increases slightly in the urban areas, whil
decreasing slightly in the rural areas.  Because the rural areas represent about 80%
of the population, the overall effect is to lower the poverty rate slightly.  Given the
errors inherent in this type of calculation, we conclude that the price changes
associated to the removal of export quota have little effect on the total number of
people living in extreme poverty. 
 
With Quota Without Quota
Urban areas 3.2% 3.3%
Rural areas 11.7% 11.5%
Viet Nam 10.0% 9.9%
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 Since only 20% of the population lives in urban areas and households are2
generally better off in urban areas than rural, under this definition only 3% of the
population is classified as urban poor.
It is worth noting that the three groups that lose (on average) are relatively
small, each accounting for less than 4% of the population.   Thus, one option would2
be to replace the export quota with an export tax and use some or all of the tax
revenue to fund assistance programs targeted at vulnerable households and rice
deficit regions (see IFPRI, 1996, chapter 12, section 3).  
Elimination of Barriers to Internal Trade
The model was also used to simulate the impact of eliminating restrictions on
internal rice movements (the rice export quota is maintained in this scenario).  As
noted above, the price equations force the differences between prices in different
regions to be no greater than the sum of actual cost of transportation and an implicit
tax associated with restrictions on internal trade.  The actual costs of transportation
were calculated from data provided by traders and state-owned enterprises
regarding recent rice shipments.  The implicit tax associated with restrictions was
inferred from the gap between observed price differences and the cost of
transportation.  To simulate the effect of eliminating restrictions on internal trade,
we remove the implicit tax terms in the price equation so that regional price
differentials are constrained to be less than or equal to the actual cost of
transportation.  
The model indicates that eliminating internal trade restrictions would cause
the consumer rice price to fall 2% on average and paddy prices to rise 0.5% on
average (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 12, section 4).  These averages, however, hide
Table 16.  Regional Effects of 
Removing Internal Trade Restrictions
Source:  Simulation based on VASEM
Region
Change in Rice 
Price (%)
Change in Rice 
Production (%)
Change in Rice 
Consumption 
(%)
North Mountains and 
Midlands
-10.5 -6.1 8.3
Red River Delta -8 -5 6.3
North Central Coast -4.8 -2.8 3.5
South Central Coast 5.2 2.6 -4.4
Central Highlands 2.3 0.9 -1.9
North East South 6.8 3.1 -7
Mekong River Delta 6.9 3.8 -6.1
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 Note that the export quota differs from an “equivalent” export ax in this case.3
With an export tax, rice prices in the exporting region (the MRD) would be fixed at
the world price minus the tax, so prices in the north would fall by the full amount of
the reduction in the north-south price differential.  Under a binding export quota, in
contrast, MRD prices are not tied to world prices.  An increase in internal (northern)
demand for rice raises prices in the south at the same time that the increased
supply in the north lowers prices there.  The implicit export tax associated with the
quota declines.  
 Again, the result would be different under an export tax or under free trade.4
In either of these two cases, the removal of internal trade restrictions diverts some
of the MRD surplus to the north, thus reducing exports by several hundred
thousand tons.   
significant regional differencs.  As shown in Table 16, rice prices rise 6-7% in the
south and fall 8% in the north.  Inter-regional rice shipments increase from 2.1 to3
2.4 million tons, as more rice is shipped from south to north.  The lower prices in the
north convert the RRD from a rice-surplus region to a rice-deficit region. The export
quota continues to be binding so there is no change in the level of exports.4
The distributional effects are not surprising.  MRD farmers in the south and
urban households in the north gain, while consumers in the south and farmers in
the RRD lose.  Nonetheless, the welfare effects for all of these groups are relatively
small: the effect on real income is less than 2.5% for all groups considered.
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 This conclusion assumes that the relationship between income and rice5
consumption over time follows the cross-sectional patterns observed in the Viet
Nam Living Standards Survey.  
 This estimate does not, however, include any losses in the form of reduced6
tolls or other revenue accuring to government authorities that regulate internal
trade.
Per capita farm income rises by 1.9%, while overall income per capita grows
by 0.4%. In absolute terms, this represents a US$99 million gain in income for
Vietnamese households.  To put this figure in perspective, these  gains are more
than 40% larger than the benefits within staple food markets of cutting domestic
transportation costs in half (see IFPRI, 1996, chapter 12, section 4).   Naturally,
these two figures are not directly comparable because better roads generate
benefits in non-food markets as well.  Nonetheless, in terms of improving food
markets, there seems little point in investments to improve the road n twork until
after essentially costless steps to eliminate legal and administrative obstacles are
undertaken.  
Long-run Prospects for Rice Exports
The model was also used to examine the interaction between policy, income
growth, and technological change in the rice sector over the period 1995-2005.  A
base scenario for 2005 was adopted assuming 2 percent annual population growth,
8 percent annual non-farm income growth, and 2 percent annual growth in
agricultural productivity.  The productivity growth is represented by shifts in the
supply curves so they do not necessarily imply 2 percent growth in the quantity of
agricultural output (see IFPRI, 1996, chapter 12, section 5). 
The results suggest that income growth, by itself, will not threaten the
continued rice export expansion.  Although per capita income gr wth has been very
high in recent years (7-10%), per capita rice consumption may rise initially, but t
should begin to fall as Vietnamese consumers diversify their diets.  Thi  view5
agrees with the assessment of the USDA (1995) that “per capita consumption rates
in Indonesia and Viet Nam, being among the highest in the world, have little upward
potential.”  
A second conclusion is that a 2 percentage point difference in rice productivity
growth can result in a US$ 600 million difference in total annual income by 2005
(IFPRI, 1996, chapter 12, section 5).  This figure represents the gains accruing to
consumers due to lower retail prices and the gains of farmers due to increased
output and lower costs of production (though these gains are offset by lower
prices) .  This result does not necessarily imply that the gains from agricultural6
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research outweigh the benefits, but it does suggest that the benefits of improving
rice productivity are “large”.
Third, the overall gain in income from eliminating the rice export quota is
roughly equal to the gains from a 2 percentage point increase in rice productivity
over ten years (IFPRI, 1996, chapter 12, section 5).  To be more specific, total
income in 2005 would be roughly the same with the 1996 export quota of 2.8 million
tons and 4% growth in rice productivity as it would with no quota and a 2% growth
rate in rice productivity.  In this case, the export quota essentially negates the
positive benefits of the 2 percentage points of additional rice productivity growth.
CONCLUSIONS
As rice is the main sector in agriculture and as rice is the main crop grown by
the majority of the population of Viet Nam, the development of the rice marketing
of Viet Nam has important repercussions not only for the rural economy but also for
the entire economy of Viet Nam.  Six main conclusions emerge from the previous
analysis of rice markets in Viet Nam.  The conclusions can be express d as follows:
1) future growth of the rice sector relies on rice exports; 2) Viet Nam has a large
potential for rice exports; 3) the big potential relies upon the development of private
marketing; 4) the private marketing is still underdeveloped; 5) targeting is the best
way to address food security; and 6) macroeconomic bias against agriculture
should be removed.  The following sections expand further on each of these
conclusions.
Conclusion #1:  Future Growth of the Rice Sector Relies on Rice Exports
In addition to increases in productivity, future growth of the rice
sector depends on the dramatic increase of rice exports.  As the
domestic market cannot absorb increases in production, the price
of rice will decline unless external demand provides an outlet for
increased production.  If exports are not allowed to expand,
farmers will not have the incentive to increase rice production, in
spite of sectoral policies that promote agricultural productivity.
In a market economy, relative prices are the principal determinant of the
allocation and use of scarce resources.  They influence what goods and services
will be produced, how they will be produced, and how they will be distributed among
the population.  Past rice policies have focused on measures aimed at increasing
productivity such as irrigation investment, extension of yield improving varieties,
modern plant nutrition and plant protection inputs, and mechanization.  In the future,
price incentives will be increasingly important, as farmers guide their planting
decisions based on profitability.
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The agricultural sector model VASEM confirms the previous considerations.
In spite of rapid advances in agricultura  productivity over ten years, farmers would
be worse off than they were in 1995.  The increase in rice production (34 percent)
is offset by declining rice prices (12 percent) and rising farm population (22
percent).
The export quota, by holding down food prices, effectively transfers the
benefits of agricultural productivity improvements from farmers to consumers.  Rice
consumption rises 39 percent, faster than the 22 percent increase in population.
Although higher incomes would reduce per capita rice consumption at constant
prices, the lower prices induce an increase in per capita demand.  The welfar
effect on the poor is, however, quite disappointing as both poor and non-poor
households in rural areas lose.
Conclusion #2.  Viet Nam Has a Large Potential for Rice Exports
Viet Nam has considerable  rice export potential which is seriously
limited by a series of constraints related to: a) the policy of setting
a rice export quota; b)  infrastructural bottlenecks aggravated by
high shipping fees; c) poor quality of rice exports; and d) lack of
transparency and credibility.
a. Rice export quotas are a serious constraint to growth
To a certain extent, rice quotas insulate the domestic economy from the
vagaries of international trade.  By reducing the transmission of international prices
to domestic prices, the quota system provides a form of price stabilization.  The
export quota protects farmers from the effects of international price changes, but
only by holding income below what it would be even with low international prices.
This  stabilization, however, is achieved at a considerable cost for the national
economy.  The agricultural spatial equilibrium model shows that the elimination of
quota leads to an increase in rice production resulting in a dramatic increase in the
surplus available for export, amounting to over 4 million tons.  The rural poor and
farmers are the main beneficiaries of this policy.  Farmer income from staple food
production rises 28 percent and net welfare benefit of the poor (taking into
consideration both sales and purchases of food) increases by 5 percent.  The
growth of agriculture has multiplier effects on the rest of the economy, so that total
income of the country rises by $800 million.  The negative effects on some regions,
such as the CH and the NES could then be compensated by redistribution of the net
gains in national income.
34
b. Infrastructural bottlenecks aggravated by high shipping dues
Poor port infrastructure and congestion at Saigon port - the port out of which
70 percent of total rice exports is shipped - are responsible for high cost of
transportation of rice destined to export.  The additional port of Can Tho in the
middle of the Mekong Delta, the main surplus region of the country,  is rapidly
expanding its activities, but is still seriously constrained by insufficient investment
to improve navigation of vessels with capacity  above 5000 tons.  Poor
infrastructure, however, is not the only problem.  High shipping dues in Viet Nam
combined with the delays in loading operations and the slow movement along the
channels linking Saigon Port to the South China Sea help to explain a higher
discount of Viet Nam rice in international markets.  Although these are charges paid
by the foreign buyers ( ince most exports of rice are on a FOB basis), these fees
are undoubtedly built into the FOB price offered by these buyers.  This explains the
fact that FOB prices of Vietnamese rice are 13-15 percent lower than those from
major competitors such as Thailand.
c. Poor quality of rice exports
Quality improvement in Viet Nam rice exports has for too long been identified
with the single criterion of broken percentage.  The country has made remarkable
progress since 1989 when less than 5 percent of total exports  was 10 percent
broken or less.  Quality, however, depends on other factors, such as moisture
content, length of grain, fragrance, homogeneity, color, absence of foreign matter,
etc.  Quality improvement depends not only on processing, but on drying
technology, on variety improvement, and on storage conditions.  The process of
ensuring consistent quality in Viet Nam is complicated by the absence of larg
processing and storage facilities capable of  consistently supplying shipments of
10,000 tons or more.  The current practice is to load vessels with rice supplied by
many - often 20 or more - warehouses that assemble rice processed by an even
greater number of mills.  It is not surprising that the only consistency in quality that
can be obtained in this process is by focusing on broken percentage.
d. Lack of transparency and credibility
The development of an efficient marketing system depends on a set of
institutions that make rules known and credible, so as to avoid the transaction cost
associated with searching, negotiating, writing and enforcing of contracts.  Foreign
buyers have often complained of the arbitrariness of rice policy in Viet Nam leading
to breach of contracts, disputes concerning payments and interpretations of
contracts, negotiation practices that are very complicated and time consuming, and
a general business atmosphere much more complicated than  in neighboring
countries.  These complaints are part of the explanation of a discount of Viet Nam
rice in international markets.
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Even Vietnamese marketing agents suffer from the lack of transparency and
credibility in rice policy.  SOEs have found themselves in the position of repudiating
contracts with foreign buyers due to sudden changes in policy.  The quota
allocation system is itself a source of various conflicts among SOE that are not
completely resolved on the basis of clearly set guidelines.  The allocation of quota
and the determination of the amounts is not always based on efficiency criteria.
Conclusion #3.   Fulfilling this Potential Depends on Development of Private
Marketing
Export growth depends on the development of an efficient and
effective marketing system able to meet the needs of domestic and
international markets at low cost.  The development of such a
system relies heavily on the participation of the private sector.  The
private sector has responded very strongly to market reform;  yet,
its potential contribution to the rice sector and  to national income
is still largely underdeveloped.
a. The private sector plays a major role
While the private sector contribution to i dustrial GDP is only 31 percent, the
private sector contributes 97 percent to agricultural GDP.  The role of the private
sector in the rice system is not limited to production, but also includes marketing.
About 98 percent of paddy is procured by private marketing agents, including
traders and millers.  The presence of SOEs in the marketing system is relevant in
the marketing channels leading to rice exports, while their role in the domestic
distribution of rice is rather limited.  With over 20 percent value added in domestic
rice consumption, the private marketing agents contribute over $700 million to the
sector.  The rice export activities of SOEs would be inconceivable without the
complex web of suppliers and intermediaries from the private marketing system of
the southern regions of MRD and NES.
b. The private sector has responded very strongly to market reforms
The private sector has responded very strongly to the incentives provided by
the market oriented policies during the past 10 years.  The impressive growth of
production and the investment behavior of key marketing agents are the best
examples of this response in the rice marketing system.  Paddy production growth
of 5.1 percent per year over the past 10 years has been achieved through farmers’
expansion of cultivated area and the adoption of yield improving technologies.
Investment by marketing agents peaked in the first part of the 1990s, with millers
investing in new equipment, especially polishers for processing rice destined for
export, and traders investing in transportation equipment and s orage facilities to
meet the requirements of an expanding domestic trade.
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c. Yet, the private sector potential contribution is still largely underexploited.
The marketing system is characterized by a multitude of small marketing
agents involved both in trading and milling.  The average size of purchases and
sales is small, even in  the more developed rice system of the MRD.  With the
exception of a few large millers, polishers, and traders in the south, the marketing
agents have a very low asset base and most of their transactions are conducted at
the local level.   About 90 percent of trade flows take place within a distance of 100
km from the residence of marketing agent, and only a marginal volume of
transactions is inter-regional.
Market integration has slightly improved over the pas t n years.  The number
of segmented markets, however, is still high, and the extent of price transmission
is rather limited, with only 54 percent of price signals being transmitted on average
among spatially separated markets.  Even in comparison to other economies at
similar level of development, this is considered a low level of integration.  The low
level of market integration in Viet Nam is the result of several factors related to
internal trade restrictions and low level of infrastructural development.
Significant postharvest losses of 13-16 percent of total production occur as
the result of inadequate drying and storage facilities and processing technology
with  low milling conversion factors of 65 percent.
The low level of rice stocks held by the private sector and the relative short
stock holding periods (about two weeks for the largest millers in the MRD) are a
further indication of the low level of development of the private sector.  The limited
stocks represent a serious constraint to meet  the shipment requirements for world
market  often implying vessel sizes of over 10,000 tons.
Conclusion #4.  The Private Marketing Is Still Underdeveloped
Several factors reduce the efficiency of rice markets in Viet Nam,
thus reducing the purchasing power of households.  The main
ones refer to a) policy restrictions on  rice flows across regions; b)
barriers to entry in the export sector; c) limited access to credit for
marketing; and d) limited access to information.
a. Policy restrictions on rice flows across regions
Restrictions on inter-provincial movements of rice seriously limit the flow of
rice from south to north.  These restrictions are equivalent to  implicit taxes on rice
movements. The differential between north and south rice prices was about 700
Dong/kg in 1995.  Only 42 percent of the price gap is explained by cost of
transportation and marketing.  The remaining 58 percent is the result of various
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constraints unrelated to infrastructure.  The elimination of these implicit taxes on
domestic trade would raise national income by almost $100 million per year. 
b. Barriers to entry in the export sector
Private sector is still not allowed to participate in rice exports, even though it
is the key force responsible for producing and distributing rice in the country.  The
current system allowing only SOE to be involved in rice export could not function
without the complex web of relations with suppliers and intermediaries from the
private sector.  The development of private large mills and polishers and large
trading companies capable of meeting the requirements of international markets is
therefore made rather difficult.  This is the case in spite of a highly efficient private
sector,  with unit marketing costs between one fifth and one third of those of SOE.
c. Limited access to credit for marketing
Both the private sector and SOEs are seriously limited in their access to credit
necessary to conduct procurement operations, t  finance storage activities, and  to
fund productive investment.  Credit requirements at peak are estimated to be  five
times the actual credit obtained by SOE and ten times the credit available to private
sector.  Storage is typically of a very short-term duration and even for larger
marketing agents the average period of holding stock is about two weeks.  Even
though some investment in processing and transportation equipment has taken
place during the past six years, further investment is needed to improve the current
capital stock and complement physical stock (machinery, buildings, transportation
means) with human capital formed through training in marketing, quality control,
and financial management.
The existence of these needs does not imply that the government should
make all these investments itself.  The government, however, has an important role
to play in facilitating access to credit, in providing a predictable environment for rice
marketing, and in allowing the key participants, both from the private sector and
SOEs, to make their own investments in storage, processing, and transportation.
d. Limited access to information
Most information related to prices, regulations, and market conditions are
communicated through personal contacts.  There are no official channels of
communication of market relevant information among the private sector such as
those provided by trade associations and chambers of commerce in other countries.
Even  for rice exports, a flexible marketing system capable of meeting  the
challenge of dynamic and continuously changing international markets has not yet
developed.  The country is not pursuing an aggressive marketing strategy aimed
at increasing its market share in world markets, thereby endangering its current
position among leading exporters and risking to be overtaken by its more dynamic
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competitors.  The absence of private sector intermediaries who search for potential
buyers and who negotiate between buyers and sellers in the world market is also
an indication of a marketing system that is still very far from fully developed.
Conclusion #5. Targeting and Income Growth Are the Best Ways to Address
Food Security
Targeting and income growth are the most effective ways to
address food security.  Price policy and internal and external trade
restrictions are not an effective way to meet food needs of the poor
in so far as they lower the growth of the economy and are not
targeted to the food insecure.
Most of the scenarios studied under various policy options show that low food
prices are benefitting consumers at the expenses of farmers, the rural poor, and
national income.  The assumption that the poor are necessarily penalized by high
rice prices is not warranted by the analysis of household surveys showing that 37
percent of the poor are net sellers.  It can be  shown that it is possible to implement
food or cash redistribution mechanisms to compensate the food insecure (see
IFPRI 1996, chapter 12, section 3). 
Conclusion #6.  Macroeconomic Policy Penalized Agriculture 
The positive impact of sectoral policies to promote agricultural
growth may be diminished or even reversed by macroeconomic
policies that reduce farmers incentives through inflationary policy
and appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Macroeconomic stabilization in the early 1990s has had a positive effect in
reducing inflation and has contributed to lowering the price variability of rice
markets during the 1980s.  Macroeconomic policies, however, have not been able
to improve the rice farmers incentives during the 1990s.  Real prices of paddy  have
declined by over 30 percent since 1989; moreover, the competitiveness of rice
prices has also declined relatively to fertilizer, the main material input (see IFPRI
1996, chapter 9).  
The most significant determinant of the observed decline was the large
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which reduced the relative profitability of all
tradable goods, including rice.  Thereal exchange rate decreased at a rate of 12.5
percent annually from 1989 to 1995, more than offsetting the combined impact of
the favorable changes in foreign prices and sectoral policies promoting  rice
production.  The real exchange rate appreciation was sustained by increased
current-account deficits and capital inflows during 1993-95.  
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The large devaluations of the years 1990 to 1992 did not result in a real
exchange rate depreciation because of rapid domestic inflation, averaging 52
percent annually.  The inflation was fueled by xpansionary monetary policy, which
in turn was caused by the large fiscal deficits that averaged 9 percent of GDP
during 1990-92.  Subsequently, more prudent monetary and fiscal policies were
adopted, as reflected in the sharp reduction of the inflation rate to an average of
16.2 percent during 1993-95.  The latter subperiod was, however, characterized by
a relatively stable nominal exchange rate, so that the real exchange rate further
appreciated at an average annual rate of 14.5 percent.
If sustained over time, real exchange rate appreciation may nullify the gains
of productivity obtained through technological change in agriculture.  The
agricultural sector spatial equilibrium model shows that under a scenario of a
growth of production of 2 percent annually over 10 years period and just 2.6 percent
annual appreciation of the real exchange rate, farmers are not only unable to
benefit from technological change but, in fact, their income per capita is reduced by
9 percent (see IFPRI 1996, chapter 12, section 5).
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
 Viet Nam could rival Thailand as the largest exporter in the world by year
2005 provided that rice exports are not too heavily taxed, that quotas are not too
restrictive, and that the exchange rate depreciates at a pace close to that of
inflation.  In order to exploit this large potential, the obstacles that prevent the
development of an efficient and effective marketing system have to be removed.
The conclusions presented in the previous section suggest a set of policy
recommendations to improve the rice marketing system of Viet Nam while
contributing to higher national income, higher farmers income, and food security.
The recommendations are organized into five groups: 1) elimination of external and
internal restrictions; 2) promotion of rice marketing measures; 3) macroeconomic
stability; 4) targeting and food security; 5) agricultural research.
Recommendation #1.  Elimination of External and Internal Restrictions
The rice export quota system should be progressively dismantled
Having shown the benefit to the country, the farmers, and the poor of
increasing rice exports, the issue is how to dismantle the current system gradually
over time in order to avoid destabilization of the markets.  Different options are
available.  
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a.  Progressively increase the quota until it is not binding
If the current quota of 2.8 million tons is i creased by 7 percent per year over
a period of 10 years, given the base assumptions on productivity and population
growth, it would result in a quota of 5.7 million tons in 2005.  Farmers and the poor
would benefit from this situation as opposed to the  base scenario with lower quota
that penalized the farmers, the poor, and the national economy.
b.  Substitute current quotas with export taxes
We have seen that the quota system  in 1995 was equivalent to n implicit tax
on exports of 24 percent amounting to a rent of $128 million.  SOEs were the real
beneficiaries of the system, while farmers, the rural poo , and national income were
the losers.  This quota system could be converted to a more  transparent system
of taxation, maybe set at a level of 10-20 percent in the short term and to zero in the
longer term.  Not only does this increase national income, but it reduces the
incentives for smuggling and the need for restrictions on internal trade.  Part of this
export tax could be used for targeted food programs, investment in agricultural
research, or promotion of marketing.
The private sector should be given access to rice exports
The elimination of barriers to entry of the private sector in the rice export
business would contribute to the development of a strong private sector capable of
competing internationally.  The competition with SOEs would lower the cost of
marketing of the latter and improve the efficiency of the system.  Even after taking
into account the higher taxes paid by SOEs with respect to the private sector, SOE
unit marketing and operating costs are  five times higher.  Moreover, the
development of the private sector w uld free the government from making some of
the investment needed to improve the marketing system.  We have seen that the
private sector has already responded positively to the market policies promoted
during the past 7 years.  This response could be further accelerated if the long-
distance trade, both domestic and international, were opened up to the private
sector. 
Internal policy restrictions on rice movement should be dismantled and internal trade
freely allowed
The cost of the current restrictions of south-north trade is paid by consumers
in the north who have to pay higher prices for rice and farmers in the south who
receive lower prices for paddy.  We have seen that the value of this change in
policy is $62 million per year and that increases farmers income by 1.9 percent and
staple calories by 0.8 percent.  The interesting aspect of this policy is that by
removing restrictions on internal trade it generates benefits for the Vietnamese
economy that are more than 65 percent larger than the benefits of cutting
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transportation costs in half.  Furthermore, the elimination of restrictions on internal
trade is a policy that could be implemented at virtually no cost, while improvement
in transportation infrastructure is a costly and time-consuming process.  This is not
to suggest that investment in infrastructure is not useful.  But there is little point in
improving infrastructure unless legal and administrative restrictions on trade have
been lifted.
 
Recommendation #2.  Promotion of Rice Marketing
a.  Rice export should be promoted with a set of measures to improve rice quality,
reduce shipping costs, and improve the reputation of Viet Nam exporters among
foreign buyers.  
Key among these measures are the institution of quality standards and quality
control systems, improved port infrastructure both in HCMC and in Can Tho and
lower port fees, and enforcement of contracts and commitments of Vietnamese
exporters with foreign buyers.
b.  Provide access to credit to marketing agents to facilitate procurement operations,
storage activities, and investment in processing and transportation.  
Credit should not be subsidized, but given on the basis of sound banking
principles.
c. Provide access to information concerning prices, food production, international
markets, and marketing system to a variety of marketing agents, both in the private
and public sector.
Central to this policy is the extension of marketing information through
publications, bulletins, electronic mail, fax, and training activities in Viet Nam and
abroad.
d.  Stability and credibility of policy are critical to its success.  
A firm commitment to the promotion of private sector development in rice
markets will be accompanied by a growth of private investment to improve the
marketing system that complements the public investment in the past.
Recommendation #3.  Remove Macroeconomic Bias Against Agriculture
Macroeconomic policies should be monitored in order to avoid penalizing
farmers with real exchange rate appreciation that will reduce exports and farmers
incentives.
Policy decisions made outside the Ministry of Agriculture have had an indirect
but predominant price effect.  Not only producers of rice, but also those of other
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tradable goods (agricultural and nonagricultural) will benefit if the fiscal and
monetary authorities succeed in further reducing the difference between domestic
and foreign inflation rates.
Recommendation #4.  Target the Poor and Food Insecure
Food security stocks and distribution targeted to food insecure households
The benefit to the poor of policies that promote agricultural growth are higher
than those achieved by keeping rice prices low and restricting domestic or external
trade. The analysis of household budgets indicates that the biggest losers from
higher rice prices are the urban poor and the rural non-farmers, but these groups
are relatively small.  The urban poor include only 3 percent of the population, while
rural non-farmers are 9 percent of the population, but only one third of them are
poor.
Food or cash distribution program have been repeatedly shown in a number
of countries to be more efficient (that is lower cost) and more effective at reaching
the poor than price or trade policy restrictions.  Examples of these programs are
self-targeted programs such as rice-for-work public works projects and low-quality
rice distribution.  Part of the benefits from increased exports such as those arising
from implicit or explicit export tax revenues should be used to finance these
programs.
Recommendation #5.  Invest in Agricultural Research
Part of the export tax revenues should be earmarked for agricultural research
investments described in the following paragraphs.
Investment in agricultural research targeted to improve yield
It has been shown that a 2 percent point difference in food productivity growth
results in a US$600 million difference in income after 10 years.  Agricultural
productivity alone, however, will not benefit the economy or farmers if the right
incentives are not provided.  A tight quota, for example, will discourage production
and negate the benefits of this productivity growth.  
Investment in agricultural research targeted at improving quality
Agricultural research has been for too long focuses on yield improving
technology.  Without diminishing the importance of yield improving technology,
complementary research should address the issue of variety improvement that
contribute to higher quality of rice.  
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Investment in post-harvest technology
Existing post-harvest technology is still expensive and not affordable by the
majority of farmers and marketing agents.  While improved incentives will contribute
to private investment in postharvest t chnology, public investment should focus on
promoting new cost-effective postharvest technology, particularly in loss-reducing
drying and storage methods.
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APPENDIX 1: STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The following is a list of the nine types of endogenous variables, along with
the number of variables in each category.  
BS  Budget share for commodity c in region r 28cr
S   Supply of commodity c in region r 28cr 
PS Producer price for commodity c in region r 28cr
PD Consumer price for commodity c in region r 28cr
M Imports of commodity c into region r 28cr
X Export of commodity c from region r 28cr
TQ Quantities of commodity c transported from crr'
region r to region r' 196
Y Nominal income of household in region r 7r
P Consumer price index 7r
IXT Implicit export tax associated with quota 4c
Demand:  The budget share for commodity c in region r (BS) is a function of the log
of consumer prices of the four commodities (PD) and the log of real income, where
real income is nominal income (Y) deflated by Stone's price index (P).  
Supply: The supply of commodity c in region r (S) is determined by the producer
prices of all four commodities in region r (PS).
Price index: The Stone's price index in each region r (P) is a geometric weighted
average of the four consumer prices (PD), where the weights are the budget shares
(BS) of the respective commodities.  
Supply balance The supply of each commodity in each region (S) must be greater
than or equal to the sum of the shipments from that region r to other regions in the
country (TQ) and exports from the region (X).  Note that the shipments (TQ) include
Scr $ j
7
r )'1
TQcr r ) % Xc r
j
7
r )'1
TQc r )r % Mcr $ BSc rYr/PDcr
Yr ' NFYr % 0.65(j
4
c'1
YRc(ScrPDcr)&FY0) % j
4
c'1
YRc (ScrPDc r)
PScr % TPr r ) % ITXr r ) % MKTc $ PDc r )
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 Production is valued at consumer prices (PD) for two reasons.  First, total7
expenditure, as calculated in the VLSS, values home production at consumer
prices.  Since 60 percent of rice production is in the form of home production, it is
more consistent to calculate income at consumer prices than producer prices.
Second, the majority of households (and even a majority of farmers) in Vi t Nam are
net buyers of rice.  For these households, the opportunity cost of an additional unit
of production is the consumer price of rice.   
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
the movement of the commodities from producers in each region to consumers in
the same region. 
Demand balance   Similarly, the sum of the shipments of commodity c into region
r (TQ) plus the imports of commodity c into region r is greater than the quantity
demanded of commodity c in region r.  
Income  The income of each region (Y) is defined as the sum of nonfarm income
(NFY) and farm income.  Farm income is the sum of net revenue from each of the
four crops, where net revenue is assumed to be a constant proportion (YR) of the
value of production.  Nonfarm income is exogenous in the base scenario (NFY),7 0
but a multiplier is used to reflect the indirect effect of growth in farm income over the
base value (FY) on non-farm income.  The multiplier of 0.65 implies that a 1 unit0
expansion in farm income results in a 0.65 unit increase in nonfarm income.  
Internal price relations  The consumer price for a commodity in region r (PD) is
greater than or equal to the sum of the producer price in region r*, the
transportation costs from region r* to region r (TP), the implicit tax between r* and
r (ITX), and the product-specific cost of processing and marketing (MKT).  
PMc % TPworld r % ITXworld r $ PDc r
PScr % TPr world % ITXrworld % IXTc $ PXc
XQUOTAc $ j
7
r'1
Xc r
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(8)
(10)
Import-domestic price relations  The consumer price of commodity c in region r
(PD) is no larger than the CIF import price (PM) plus transportation costs to region
r (TP), plus the implicit tax associated with this transportation (ITX), plus the implicit
tax associated with import quotas (IMT), if any.  
Export-domestic price relations  The producer price of commodity c in region r
(PS) plus transportation costs from region r to the border (TP) plus the implicit tax
associated with this transportation (ITX) plus the implicit tax associated with export
quotas (IXT), if any, must be greater than or equal to the export (FOB) price on
world markets.  
Export quota   The exports of comodity c (X) cannot exceeding the export quota
(XQUOTA) for that commodity.  This equation is used to impose the rice export
quota.
The model consists of 10 blocks:  four equations and six inequalities.  Th
software used (GAMS/MCP)  constructs the equations corresponding to the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for each inequality.  The programer needs only identify th
Lagrange multiplier that corresponds to each inequality.  The multiplier for the
supply and demand equations (1 and 2) are the producer prices (PS) and consumer
prices (PD), respectively.  The multiplier for the domestic price equation (7) is TQ,
the shipments between regions.  The multiplier for the import and export price
equations (8 and 9) are imports (M) and exports (X) , respectively.  Finally, the
multipliers for the export quota equations (10) is the implicit export tax (IXT),
respectively.
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